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in the auto industry
by Thomas Klier, senior economist
This article examines the recent break in the relationship between motor vehicle
production and the auto region’s employment, particularly the impact of the decline in
Big Three market share.
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U.S. light vehicle sales have continued
at very solid levels over the past several
years, averaging 16.7 million units since
2001.1 Yet the unemployment rate in
Michigan—the most auto intensive
state in the U.S.—has
stayed above the na-
tional and the Mid-
west average for over




clical swings than the
rest of economic ac-
tivity. When things
are going well, the
auto region’s employ-
ment conditions tend
to be good. So how
do we explain the re-
cent break in the re-
lationship between
motor vehicle pro-
duction and the auto
region’s employment?
One possible explanation is an increase
in U.S. vehicle sales produced outside
the country. But the import share of
light vehicle sales has increased only
moderately, from 17% in 2000 to 20%
at the end of 2004, and domestic pro-
duction of light vehicles has averaged
around 12 million units since 2001.
A more plausible explanation for
Michigan’s elevated unemployment
rate is a shift in the regional distribution
of production. Although the number
of light vehicles produced in the U.S.
has held fairly steady during the last
two years, auto production in the Sev-
enth District, which includes the key
auto sector states Michigan and Indi-
ana, has performed quite differently
(see figure 1). Indeed, the District’s
share of passenger car production has
declined significantly vis à vis the rest
of the country. That share fluctuated
between 45% and 50% between 1997
and 2003, but has since fallen rapidly,
reaching 31.7% in August 2004, its low-
est level in over a decade. That devel-
opment is also reflected in the District’s
share of auto industry employment
(see figure 2). Until the end of 1996,
the core of the auto region, the states
of Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio, was
home to the majority of auto industry
jobs. And while the region’s leadership
gap over the rest of the country was
shrinking during the first half of the
1990s, auto sector jobs grew in both
the region and the nation during these
years. From 1996 until the second half
of 2002, auto industry employment
was pretty evenly divided between the
three core auto states and the rest of
the country. Since then, however, auto
industry employment in the core states
has fallen off noticeably at a time of2. U.S. light vehicle production and employment
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board's Industrial Production Index and BLS.
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rather stable levels of light vehicle pro-
duction. At the same time, industry em-
ployment outside the three core auto
states has remained stable.
What seems to be driving this develop-
ment is a continued market share loss
for domestic producers to foreign name-
plates, an increasing share of which is
being produced within the U.S. (see
figure 3).3 For example, Chrysler, GM,
and Ford have lost over 6 percentage
points of domestic sales to foreign pro-
ducers since 2000, resulting in an all-
time low market share for the Big Three
of 58.7% in December 2004. In the
context of the geography of the U.S.
car industry that is an important trend,
because the production facilities of
foreign assemblers tend to be located
outside the traditional auto-producing
states of Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio.4
The economic importance of this geo-
graphic shift is magnified by the tight
linkages between auto assembly and
production of parts and components.
On average, for every auto assembly job
in the U.S. there are six in related parts
production, as well as ancillary jobs in
services and transportation.5 More im-
portantly, supplier plant locations tend
to remain proximate to assembly plants
because of just-in-time production re-
quirements. Accordingly, the majority of
an assembly plant’s suppliers are typi-
cally located within one day’s driving
distance, which corresponds to about
450 miles.6 All of this
suggests that the ero-
sion of Michigan’s
role in the auto in-
dustry—both assembly
and related parts—is
being driven by the
ongoing loss of mar-
ket share rather than
by cyclical factors.
How has this recent
adjustment played
out in terms of em-
ployment? Figure 4
shows that the indus-
try shed over 155,000
jobs between 2000
and 2003.7 The vast
majority of these are
concentrated in the auto supplier seg-
ment of the industry rather than in as-
sembly operations. Michigan, Indiana,
and Ohio as a group fared worse than
the rest of the country, losing 17.8% of
their parts industry jobs compared with
13.5% for the remaining states. Among
these three states, Michigan has fared
the worst during the past three years,
losing over 20% of its auto supplier
employment. This performance gap is
magnified by Michigan’s strong reliance
on the auto industry. The state is home
to one-quarter of auto supplier em-
ployment, with the three core states
jointly accounting for half.
Plant-level data allows us to trace the
job losses for auto assembly plants and
their “captive” suppliers (facilities owned
and operated by the assembly compa-
nies, such as stamping or engine plants).
Figure 5 shows that assembly plant
employment fell by just over 2% over-
all between 2000 and 2003. That loss
of jobs can be entirely accounted for
by employment losses at domestic as-
sembly facilities. The assembly plants
of foreign companies added employ-
ment, most of it, however, outside the
core auto region. A much bigger em-
ployment adjustment took place among
the so-called captive parts plants, which
are almost exclusively domestic captives
of the Big Three. According to figure 5,
these plants shed 35,000 jobs between
2000 and 2003, more than one-quar-
ter of their employment. Once I adjust
for plants that were sold to indepen-
dent supplier companies and there-
fore dropped out of the captive category
(but probably continued to operate),
the tally of job losses falls to 19%.8
There are two main factors behind that
rather dramatic number: Plant closures
(including plants for which closings
have been announced but not yet im-
plemented) account for 28% of these
job losses. The remaining 72% is attrib-
utable to job reductions at existing
and continuing plants, representing
productivity improvements as well as
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the effects of greater outsourcing of
parts production to non-captive sup-
pliers, many of which are operating
production facilities outside the Unit-
ed States. At the same time, a small
number of U.S.-based foreign captives
grew, but off of a very small base.
Unfortunately, there are no reliable
time-series data available on plant-level
employment in the independent auto
supplier sector that would allow one to
perform a similar analysis for that piece
of the industry. But the aggregate num-
bers for independent suppliers present-
ed in figure 4 show a relatively smaller
loss of jobs in the non-traditional auto
states as well. So the changing fortunes
of domestic and foreign assembly plant
customers appear to be profoundly re-
shaping the regional distribution of
supplier employment.
At the same time, the globalization of
parts production has been slowing out-
put growth from the U.S. overall. U.S.
auto parts production grew by 12.8%
between 1997 and 2002, but during the
same time imports of auto parts grew
by 52.1%.9 In 2003, the largest source
countries for auto parts remained
Canada and Mexico. Together these
two countries accounted for 55.7% of
all parts imports. Imported parts from
5. Plant-level detail
2000 2003 % change
Assembly plants U.S. 160.16 156.8 –2.10
MI, IN, OH 71.59 67.94 –5.11
Michigan 42.31 38.02 –10.13
Other states 88.57 88.87 0.34
Captive suppliers U.S. 137.07 102.14 –25.49
MI, IN, OH 112.91 85.97 –23.86
Michigan 58.22 44.87 –22.93
Other states 24.17 16.17 –33.10
Combined U.S. 297.23 258.94 –12.88
MI, IN, OH 184.5 153.91 –16.58
Michigan 100.53 82.89 –17.55
Other states 112.74 105.04 –6.83
NOTE: Jobs are measured in thousands.
SOURCE: Harbour Consulting, Harbour Report, 2004, 2001 and company websites.
4. Motor vehicle manufacturing employment decline
2000 2003 % change
Assembly U.S. 291.4 267.5 –8.2
MI, IN, OH 143.3 124.3 –13.3
Michigan 94.3 80.0 –15.2
Other states 148.1 143.2 –3.3
Parts U.S. 839.4 707.5 –15.7
MI, IN, OH 432.6 355.5 –17.8
Michigan 226.2 180.1 –20.4
Other states 406.8 352.0 –13.5
Combined U.S. 1,130.8 975.0 –13.8
MI, IN, OH 575.9 479.8 –16.7
Michigan 320.5 260.1 –18.8
Other states 554.9 495.2 –10.7
NOTE: Assembly jobs are measured at NAICS 33611; that is, they include medium and heavy duty trucks. Employment
is measured in thousands.
SOURCE: BLS.
Asia represented 29%. Within that
group, Japan’s share has dropped by
6% to 18.2% in the past ten years. Im-
ports from China have more than tri-
pled, but off of a very small base.
China now accounts for 4.1% of all
auto parts imports.
Conclusion
Since the geography of production of
light vehicles is different for domestic
and foreign producers and suppliers,
the continued decline of Big Three mar-
ket share is having a noticeable impact
on the core auto region, especially
Michigan. Between 1995 and December
2004, the domestic share of the U.S.
light vehicle market dropped from
73.2% to 58.7%. Assuming a minimum
efficient scale of about 200,000 units
for a modern assembly plant, that cor-
responds to the capacity of about ten
assembly plants.10 In fact, four Big Three
assembly plants have been closed in the
U.S. and Canada since then and anoth-
er four are set to close within a year.
The data presented here clearly show
that the larger impact of a retrenchment
of domestic producers plays out in the
supplier sector. Michigan stands out as
the heart of the supplier industry. While
it is performing only slightly worse than
























































































































































































































of auto industry jobs lost, the auto sec-
tor plays a much more important role
in Michigan’s economy than it does in
any other state.11
Still, while the old-line auto states
have been losing production to the
southern end of the auto corridor,
Michigan has strengthened its role as
the center of headquarters, research,
and design (R&D) functions in this in-
dustry during the past 15 years. About
half of the largest 150 auto supplier
companies are headquartered in the
Detroit area, and virtually every global
1 The term light vehicles refers to passenger
cars and light trucks, which include mini-
vans and sport utility vehicles.
2 Midwest here refers to the Seventh District
states of Wisconsin, Iowa, Illinois, Michigan,
and Indiana; Ohio is not included.
3 While foreign producers entered the mar-
ket for cars first, they have since added a
growing number of light truck models, both
imported and produced in North America.
4 See Thomas Klier, Paul Ma, and Daniel
McMillen, 2004, “Comparing location de-
cisions of domestic and foreign auto sup-
pliers,” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,
working paper, No. 27, and Thomas Klier,
2004, “Challenges to the U.S. auto industry,”
Chicago Fed Letter, Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago, March, No. 200a. Michigan,
Indiana, and Ohio are home to 44% of
all light vehicle assembly plants in the
U.S. Of these, 80% are Big Three facilities.
However, six of the 13 U.S. foreign-owned
light vehicle assembly plants are located
south of Indiana and Ohio.
5 To arrive at that factor I relate the number
of light vehicle assembly jobs from figure
5 to the sum of parts jobs from figure 4
and captive supplier jobs from figure 5.
We adjust the parts jobs from figure 4 to
allow for an undercount (see endnote 7).
For a detailed analysis of ancillary jobs re-
lated to the auto sector see Sean McAlinden,
Kim Hill, and Bernard Swiecki, 2003, Eco-
nomic Contribution of the Automotive Indus-
try to the U.S.—An Update, Ann Arbor, MI:
Center for Automotive Research.
6 See Thomas Klier, 2000, “Spatial concen-
tration in the U.S. auto supplier industry,”
The Review of Regional Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3.
7 In fact, that number probably undercounts
the level of job losses, because the size of
the auto supplier industry is notoriously
hard to gauge with aggregate data. Ongo-
ing research with data on auto parts im-
ports suggests that the undercount in the
auto parts sector is on the order of 15%.
8 That is a lower bound, because it is not
known to what extent the new owners of
the former captive supplier plants reduced
employment.
9 Motor vehicle parts imports grew from
18.4% of U.S. production in 1997 to 34.1%
in 2002.
10See Joseph F. Francois and Dean Spinanger,
2004, “Regulated efficiency, world trade
accession, and the motor vehicle sector
in China,” Tinbergen Institute, discussion
paper, No. 2004-049/2. The authors note
that for assembly plants producing a single
model, the efficient scale is just over
200,000 cars per year. The size of the market
for light vehicles in the U.S. was around
15 million units during the second half of
the 1990s and has averaged 16.5 million
units since then. Applying these numbers
to calibrate the impact of a 14 percentage
point market share loss corresponds to
the capacity of ten to 11 assembly plants
(at 200,000 units per plant).
11This issue is receiving great attention in
Michigan. See, for example, Governor
Granholm’s speech given at the Traverse
City Management Briefing Seminar last
August at http://www.michigan.gov/gov/
0,1607,7-168-23442_21974-98324—
M_2004_8,00.html and Terry Kosdrosky,
2004, “Economic downshift,” in Crain’s
Detroit Business, November 19, p. 1.
automotive company retains a signifi-
cant R&D presence there. Further-
more, the fortunes of individual
companies are historically volatile.
The Big Three and their suppliers
may yet mount a concerted comeback
in the marketplace.